Achieving Efficiency Through State and Local Preparedness
TLDR
This executive order shifts emergency management responsibility from federal to state/local levels, reduces the “all-hazards approach,” calls for reviewing previous infrastructure policies, creates a National Risk Register for threat assessment, and emphasizes individual preparedness. Critics worry this could lead to inequality in disaster response, critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, reduced federal disaster relief, coordination failures during multi-state emergencies, privatization of essential services, and potential national security vulnerabilities.
This executive order appears to be a significant restructuring of national security and emergency management frameworks. While presented as enhancing resilience and efficiency, there are several concerning aspects beneath the surface.
This executive order fundamentally shifts responsibility for disaster preparedness and critical infrastructure protection from federal to state, local, and individual levels. The order claims this will “save American lives” and reduce “taxpayer burdens,” but it effectively represents a federal withdrawal from national emergency management responsibilities.
Key concerning elements include:
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Federal Responsibility Reduction: The order directs a move away from the “all-hazards approach” that has been fundamental to emergency management for decades. This approach ensures comprehensive preparation for various threats rather than selective ones.
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Dismantling Existing Frameworks: The order calls for reviewing and potentially revising or rescinding numerous critical infrastructure and national continuity policies established by previous administrations. This includes policies on food security, supply chains, and emergency communications.
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Ideological Targeting: The order specifically excludes policies related to “misinformation” and “cognitive infrastructure” from review, referring instead to a separate executive order (14149) focused on “Restoring Freedom of Speech”. This suggests ideological motivations rather than security concerns.
Risk Register Creation: The establishment of a “National Risk Register” to quantify threats could potentially be used to justify selective funding and support based on political priorities rather than objective threat assessment.
Potential negative outcomes include:
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Increased Inequality in Disaster Response: Wealthier states and localities will be better positioned to fund their own emergency management systems, while poorer areas will likely experience degraded disaster response capabilities.
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Critical Infrastructure Vulnerabilities: National infrastructure systems (power grids, transportation networks, communication systems) that cross state boundaries require coordinated federal oversight. Fragmentation could create security gaps.
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Reduced Federal Support During Disasters: The language about ending “subsidization of mismanagement” suggests reduced federal disaster relief funding, potentially leaving disaster victims without adequate support.
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Coordination Failures: During large-scale emergencies that affect multiple states, the lack of strong federal coordination could lead to chaotic, ineffective responses.
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Privatization of Essential Services: The emphasis on “individual preparedness” may lead to essential emergency services being privatized, making access dependent on ability to pay.
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Selective Risk Management: The risk-informed approach could be manipulated to focus resources on politically advantageous threats while ignoring others that may be more dangerous but less politically expedient.
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National Security Vulnerabilities: Fragmented approaches to critical infrastructure protection could create exploitable weaknesses for adversaries targeting U.S. systems.
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This executive order represents a significant departure from decades of emergency management policy that has recognized the essential role of federal coordination and support in national resilience efforts.
REFERENCES
- 2025-03-21: Trump order pushes states to handle preparing for disasters : NPR — President Trump has signed an executive order directing state and local authorities to take a more active role in disaster preparedness, while suggesting the possibility of dismantling FEMA. The order creates a “National Resilience Strategy” aimed at simplifying federal policies on disaster response, though emergency management experts argue that states already handle disasters but rely heavily on federal resources and funding that they cannot replace on their own.
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered:
Section 1.
Purpose.
Commonsense approaches and investments by State and local governments across American infrastructure will enhance national security and create a more resilient Nation. Federal policy must rightly recognize that preparedness is most effectively owned and managed at the State, local, and even individual levels, supported by a competent, accessible, and efficient Federal Government. Citizens are the immediate beneficiaries of sound local decisions and investments designed to address risks, including cyber attacks, wildfires, hurricanes, and space weather. When States are empowered to make smart infrastructure choices, taxpayers benefit.
This order empowers State, local, and individual preparedness and injects common sense into infrastructure prioritization and strategic investments through risk-informed decisions that make our infrastructure, communities, and economy resilient to global and dynamic threats and hazards.
Sec. 2.
Policy.
It is the policy of the United States that State and local governments and individuals play a more active and significant role in national resilience and preparedness, thereby saving American lives, securing American livelihoods, reducing taxpayer burdens through efficiency, and unleashing our collective prosperity. In addition, it is the policy of the United States that my Administration streamline its preparedness operations; update relevant Government policies to reduce complexity and better protect and serve Americans; and enable State and local governments to better understand, plan for, and ultimately address the needs of their citizens.
Sec. 3.
Updating Federal Policy to Save Lives and End the Subsidization of Mismanagement.
(a) National Resilience Strategy. Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA), in coordination with the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy and the heads of relevant executive departments and agencies (agencies), shall publish a National Resilience Strategy that articulates the priorities, means, and ways to advance the resilience of the Nation. The National Resilience Strategy shall be reviewed and revised at least every 4 years, or as appropriate.
(b) National Critical Infrastructure Policy. Within 180 days of the date of this order, the APNSA, in coordination with the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy and the heads of relevant agencies, shall review all critical infrastructure policies and recommend to the President the revisions, recissions, and replacements necessary to achieve a more resilient posture; shift from an all-hazards approach to a risk-informed approach; move beyond information sharing to action; and implement the National Resilience Strategy described in subsection (a) of this section. For purposes of this order, critical infrastructure policies do not include any policies related to purported “misinformation,” “disinformation,” or “malinformation,” nor so-called “cognitive infrastructure,” which should be reevaluated consistent with the policy set forth in Executive Order 14149 of January 20, 2025 (Restoring Freedom of Speech and Ending Federal Censorship), through a separate process. The policies to be reviewed and recommended for modification, as appropriate, include:
(i) National Security Memorandum 16 of November 10, 2022 (Strengthening the Security and Resilience of United States Food and Agriculture);
(ii) National Security Memorandum 22 of April 30, 2024 (Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience);
(iii) Executive Order 14017 of February 24, 2021 (America’s Supply Chains); and
(iv) Executive Order 14123 of June 14, 2024 (White House Council on Supply Chain Resilience).
© National Continuity Policy. Within 180 days of the date of this order, the APNSA, in coordination with the heads of relevant agencies, shall review all national continuity policies and recommend to the President the revisions, recissions, and replacements necessary to modernize and streamline the approach to national continuity capabilities, reformulate the methodology and architecture necessary to achieve an enduring readiness posture, and implement the National Resilience Strategy described in subsection (a) of this section. The policies to be reviewed and recommended for modification, as appropriate, include:
(i) Executive Order 13618 of July 6, 2012 (Assignment of National Security and Emergency Preparedness Communications Functions);
(ii) Executive Order 13961 of December 7, 2020 (Governance and Integration of Federal Mission Resilience);
(iii) National Security Memorandum 32 of January 19, 2025 (National Continuity Policy); and
(iv) Executive Order 14146 of January 19, 2025 (Partial Revocation of Executive Order 13961).
(d) Preparedness and Response Policies. Within 240 days of the date of this order, the APNSA, in coordination with the heads of relevant agencies and informed by the reports and findings of the Federal Emergency Management Agency Council established pursuant to Executive Order 14180 of January 24, 2025 (Council to Assess the Federal Emergency Management Agency), shall review all national preparedness and response policies and recommend to the President the revisions, recissions, and replacements necessary to reformulate the process and metrics for Federal responsibility, move away from an all-hazards approach, and implement the National Resilience Strategy described in subsection (a) of this section. The policies to be reviewed and recommended for modification, as appropriate, include:
(i) Executive Order 12656 of November 18, 1988 (Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities);
(ii) Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 of February 28, 2003 (Management of Domestic Incidents);
(iii) Presidential Policy Directive 8 of March 30, 2011 (National Preparedness);
(iv) Presidential Policy Directive 22 of March 28, 2013 (National Special Security Events); and
(v) Presidential Policy Directive 44 of November 7, 2016 (Enhancing Domestic Incident Response).
(e) National Risk Register. Within 240 days of the date of this order, the APNSA, in coordination with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the heads of relevant agencies, shall coordinate the development of a National Risk Register that identifies, articulates, and quantifies natural and malign risks to our national infrastructure, related systems, and their users.
(i) The quantification produced by the National Risk Register shall be used to inform the Intelligence Community, private sector investments, State investments, and Federal budget priorities.
(ii) The National Risk Register shall be reviewed and revised at least every 4 years, or as appropriate, to evolve with the dynamic risk landscape.
(f) Federal National Functions Constructs. The Federal Government organizes national preparedness and continuity through the bureaucratic and complicated lens of overlapping and overbroad “functions,” which include: the National Essential Functions, Primary Mission Essential Functions, National Critical Functions, Emergency Support Functions, Recovery Support Functions, and Community Lifelines. Within 1 year of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall propose changes to the policies outlining this framework and any implementing documents to ensure State and local governments and individuals have improved communications with Federal officials and a better understanding of the Federal role. This proposal shall be coordinated through the process established by National Security Presidential Memorandum 1 of January 20, 2025 (Organization of the National Security Council and Subcommittees), or any successor processes, before being submitted to the President through the APNSA.
Sec. 4.
General Provisions.
(a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
© This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
DONALD J. TRUMP THE WHITE HOUSE, March 18, 2025.